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doubt upon it and pronounce it inconclusive. Any possible doubt, however, must be dispelled by our present epigram.

We have here, and likewise in the epitaph of Diokleas, psilosis, and this cannot come from the native dialect of Thessaly.<sup>1</sup> Its source must lie in the imported literary form; and unless one prefers to resort to the hypothesis of specific Aeolic (Lesbian),<sup>2</sup> as distinct from Homeric, influence in the development of post-Homeric epic and elegiac composition, there appears to be no escape from the conclusion that we have here an important confirmation of Wackernagel's psilotic Homer.

CARL D. BUCK

#### NOTE ON LUCRETIIUS III. 59 ff.

60           denique avarities et honorum caeca cupido  
              quae miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines  
              iuris et interdum socios scelerum atque ministros  
              noctes atque dies niti praestante labore  
              ad summas emergere opes, haec vulnera vitae  
              non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur.  
65           turpis enim ferme contemptus et acris egestas  
              semota ab dulci vita stabilique videntur  
              et quasi iam leti portas cunctarier ante;  
              unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti  
              effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse,  
70           sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque  
              conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes. . . .

Professor Masson in his *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*, p. 20, says: "The logic of the passage which follows is extraordinary. 'These wounds of life,' the poet says, 'derive by no means their least nutriment from the dread of death.' But poverty and obscurity are a kind of death in life, and 'therefore' the fear of death is the cause of men's unscrupulous struggle for power and riches!"

This misapprehension would hardly require comment were it not that it is shared by many other editors, and none, so far as I know, have brought out the full feeling of the passage. The main Epicurean thought is simple enough, though Munro and Woltjer seem to have overlooked the Epicurean parallels, and Giussani and Heinze, who give them in part, have not, I think, fully apprehended the deeper poetic meaning of the passage. It is on its face merely the obvious consideration that wealth and power are means of

<sup>1</sup> Jacobsohn, to be sure, attempts to show that psilosis is at least possible for a part of Thessaly. But the weight of evidence is against this.

<sup>2</sup> The spelling of *εἰς*, noted above, would cease to be remarkable if intended for the Aeolic form. But even so, it might be Homeric. For there is, of course, no direct evidence as to whether Homeric *εἰς* represents the Aeolic form with genuine diphthong or the Ionic form with lengthened *ε*.

defense and protection against danger and death. As Shylock says (Shakespeare *M. of V.* iv. 1):

Nay, take my life and all, . . . .  
 . . . . you take my life  
 When you do take the means whereby I live.

The earliest expression of this idea that I recall is found in that universal anticipator, the Anonymus of Iamblichus (Diels *Vorsokratiker*<sup>2</sup> 631, 31 ff.): φιλοψυχούσι μὲν, ὅτι τοῦτο ἡ ζωὴ ἐστίν, ἡ ψυχὴ· ταύτης οὖν φείδονται καὶ ποθοῦσιν αὐτὴν διὰ φιλίαν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ συνήθειαν ἢ συντρέφονται· φιλοχρηματοῦσι δὲ τῶνδε εἵνεκα, ἅπερ φοβεῖ αὐτούς. τί δ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα; αἱ νόσοι, τὸ γῆρας, αἱ ἐξαπινάοι ζημῖαι, οὐ τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων λέγω ζημίας (ταύτας μὲν γὰρ καὶ εὐλαβηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ φυλάσασθαι), ἀλλὰ τὰς τοιαύτας, πυρκαϊάς, θανάτους οἰκετῶν, τετραπόδων, ἄλλας αὐ συμφοράς, αἱ ἐπικέινται αἱ μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, αἱ δὲ τοῖς χρήμασι. τούτων δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα πάντων, ὅπως ἐς ταῦτα ἔχωσι χρῆσθαι τοῖς χρήμασι, πᾶς ἀνὴρ τοῦ πλούτου ὀρέγεται. Lucretius probably took it from the seventh *Κυρία δόξα* of Epicurus *D.L.* x. 141: ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. There are allusions to the idea in the first book of Cicero's *De finibus*, notably i. 15, and as noted by Heinze, in Porphyry *De abst.* I, 54. Lucretius himself in v. 1120 ff. uses it to enforce the Epicurean moral that we can escape this imaginative extension of the fear of death only by contenting ourselves with the little that Nature really requires. Cf. Plutarch *Septem sap. conviv.* 159 F.

But in the passage before us the genius of Lucretius, as often, adds to the plain statement of the Epicurean idea a depth and subtlety of poetic feeling that give it a new psychological significance. There is more in Lucretius' words than the mere utilitarian suggestion that wealth and power will guard us against death. There is the feeling that poverty and humiliation are a diminution of our very being, and so an approximation to death. It is what James describes in his *Psychology* (I, 291) as "a sense of a shrinking of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness. . . . We are assimilated to the poor devils whom we so despise and at the same time removed further . . . from the happy sons of earth who lord it over land and sea and rule in the full-blown lustihood that wealth and power can give."

A different expression of this psychological feeling is the remark of Burke (*Sublime and Beautiful* vii): "What generally makes pain itself, if I may say so, more painful, is that it is considered as an emissary of this kind of terrors." And still another is Emerson's observation in the *Essay on Politics*: "Senators and presidents have climbed so high with pain enough, not because they think the place specially agreeable, but as an apology for real worth, and to vindicate their manhood in our eyes." The underlying psychology is that expounded by Spinoza throughout the third book of his

*Ethics*, notably in Propositions 11, 12, 25, 53, 54, 55. Joy is enlargement of our being, and pain or grief diminution.

This is to encumber these beautiful lines with a ponderous exegesis, but we can hardly appreciate their full meaning with less.

PAUL SHOREY

### THE *MIRUM QUIN* SENTENCES

There are in Plautus ten sentences introduced by *mirum quin*.<sup>1</sup> The verb is in the subjunctive. Besides these, one example (*Persa* 442) of a *mirum quin* sentence with the indicative verb has been admitted into the text of Goetz and Schoell. Various emendations of the text have been suggested; and I do not believe the passage can with reason be brought forward as evidence that *mirum quin* was ever followed by any other mood than the subjunctive. It is said that the construction does not occur outside of Plautus.

The meaning of these sentences is clear and the ironical force present in all cases is recognized by all the editors. That which seems to be energetically asserted is manifestly contrary to fact and in some cases impossible. Hence the following example is sufficient illustration of the construction, *Trin.* 967: *Mirum quin ab avo eius aut proavo acciperem, qui sunt mortui.* "No doubt I'd get it from his grandfather or his great grandfather—they're dead you know."

The explanation of this construction commonly accepted is that it is the development of an original parataxis in which *quin* appeared as an interrogative adverb with the meaning "why not?" *Mirum quin* would mean, then, "It is strange why not." So Kienitz in the well-known article and so Durham in his *Substantive Clauses in Plautus*; though the latter doubts the deliberative character of the originally paratactic question.

Now in the third volume of *Classical Philology* I argued against the commonly accepted theories concerning the origin of the *quin* constructions in general and suggested another explanation. On the negative side the points in that argument were briefly these: Outside the clauses themselves, there is no real evidence to show that *quin* ever had the meaning "why not?" Etymologically the original value of the word may as well have been positive and demonstrative—or intensive—as negative and interrogative. Certainly there is no evidence for a meaning "why not?" in the declarative sentences, since they are neither negative nor interrogative, and certainly none in the imperative sentences. In the interrogative sentences there is never any real asking for information; the questions are rhetorical and imply a command, an implication easily given by questions other than

<sup>1</sup> *Amph.* 750; *Aul.* 85; *Cist.* 733; *Merc.* 204; *Most.* 493; *Persa* 339; *Persa* 433; *Rudens* 1393; *Trin.* 495; *Trin.* 967.